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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v*

:

JOSEPH GREG TRUJILLO,

:

Case No. 860203-CA

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The Statement of Issues, Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts are set forth in Brief of Appellant at pages iii
through 4.
ARGUMENT
In the brief of Respondent, the State takes an interesting
and fairly novel approach to this case.

First, the State argues

that Mr. Trujillo was not stopped or detained by the officer.
Rather, when the officer blocked Mr. Trujillo's path and
interrogated him, having already called for a back-up, this was only
an innocuous citizen-police encounter.

Second, even though merely

an encounter, the situation almost immediately escalated into a full
blown Terry frisk, a measure much more intrusive than an
investigatory stop.
By labeling the police officer's action an encounter rather
than a stop the State seeks to avoid Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann.
(Authority of a peace officer to stop and question suspect) and an
entire body of law developed under the Fourth Amendment.
facts of the present case the State's distinction between

Under the

"encounter" and "stop", is meaningless and artificial.

The State

has not attempted to justify the officer's action as a valid stop
supported by reasonable suspicion of a criminal activity based on
articulable facts because the facts simply will not support that
result.

Allowing the State to prevail under a "citizen encounter"

theory effectively deprives Joseph Trujillo of the personal rights
and protections he is guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and Article I Section XIV of the Utah Constitution.
I.

THE STOP OF APPELLANT WAS A SEIZURE OF HIS PERSON

A person may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable and objective grounds for doing so.
460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
occurs.

Florida v. Royer,

Otherwise, a seizure of the person

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).

Such a seizure is

constitutionally justifiable only when an articulable objective
suspicion exists that the person seized has committed or is about to
commit a crime.

Florida v. Royer, supra, at 498; Reid v. Georgia,

448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980); State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah
1985).
In the present case, the State contends that the initial
stop of Mr. Trujillo was a citizen-police encounter and not a
seizure.

Brief of Respondent at 4.

The State contends its

conclusion is supported under the rationale of two United States
Supreme Court cases dealing with the stopping of "drug couriers" at
airports.

See Florida v. Royer, supra; United States v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544 (1980)(Respondentfs Brief at 4). Those precedents are
distinguishable from the present case because of the transitory
nature of airports and the government's compelling interest in
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stopping the transportation of drugs.

In those contextsf the Court

permitted an officer to ask an individual to identify himself and
briefly answer questions and only as long as the individual is free
to leave with or without answering.

See United States v.

Mendenhall, supra.
The Supreme Court, in a case subsequent to Royer and
Mendenhall, expressly reserved ruling on whether police questioning
of an individual, without more, amounts to a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.

I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).

Under Delgado, citizen-police encounters are arguably limited to the
special situational contexts of Mendenhall and Royer or are of
questionable validity altogether.
Even accepting, arguendo, that Mendenhall and Royer are
applicable to the present case, Mr. Trujillo's detention exceeds a
mere citizen-police encounter.

In Mendenhall, the Court stated that

a person is detained or "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.

U.S. v. Mendenhall, supra at 554.

In the present case, Mr. Trujillo reasonably believed that
he was detained and "seized" by the officer.

The police officer had

been driving very slowly, about five to ten miles per hour (T. 17);
he approached Mr. Trujillo and his friends from behind pulling along
side them next to the curb (T. 17). The officer then drove down the
street, parked the car ahead of them and walked back towards the
trio, effectively blocking their path of travel (T. 9, 23). The

-3 -

officer testified that at this point the citizens appeared "nervous"
about his presence (T. 24). He told the trio to stop and not to go
anywhere (T. 39).
Officer Beesley began questioning the three men and
testified that their answers were evasive (T. 24). However, he
initially asked what they were doing in the area and they responded
that they were going to Mr. Trujillo's cousin's house (T. 26). He
next asked for identification, which one of the trio produced; the
other two told him their names (T. 26). One minute into the
questioning, a second officer arrived (T. 11). This was the backup
officer that Officer Beesley had requested prior to exiting his car
when he notified dispatch that he "was going to be, as we call it,
shaking or talking to some individuals, three individuals on the
corner of Fourth South and State" (T. 10). The arrival of the
second officer provided a show of force to the group and emphasized
that the trio was not free to leave.
The State cites United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223
(Fifth Circuit 1984) as further support for citizen-police
encounters, "[p]olice officers are free to approach individuals at
any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained
against his will."

Respondent's Brief at 4.

A brief review of the facts in Merritt discloses that the
cited language is pure dicta.

Federal and State officials stopped a

vessel later found to contain drugs.

The government never argued

this was a citizen-police encounter.

It consistently and

successfully argued that the investigatory stop was supported by an
articulable suspicion that the vessel was engaged in drug
-4 -

trafficking.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed that the stop was valid

under Terry v, Ohio standards.

Merritt at 230. The cited language

was surplusage in Merritt; it is surplusage in the present case.
The State cites State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah
1984), to establish that "[a]n officer who is rightfully in a public
place and who poses questions to an individual has not engaged in a
seizure, detention or investigatory stop."
4.

Brief of Respondent at

In Christensen, police officers were investigating a truck

abandoned at the side of the road with an attached trailer partially
obstructing traffic.

The defendant returned to the scene in another

vehicle, got out and approached the officers.

The officers asked

the defendant if he was the owner and driver of the vehicle.

The

Utah Court held that a seizure did not occur when the defendant was
asked whether he was the owner because the officers were in a
"public roadway, a public place where they had a right to be and in
responding to the question, the defendant was not detained in any
significant way."

State v. Christensen, supra at 412. In

determining whether a seizure has occurred, there is a marked
distinction between an individual approaching officers and officers
approaching a citizen and telling him to stop as occurred in the
present case.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 provides:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
This statutory codification of Terry v. Ohio, supra, does not make a
distinction between a "police-citizen encounter" and an
-5 -

investigatory stop.

The statute clearly requires a reasonable

articulable suspicion for an officer to stop any person in a public
place.
In addition, two Utah cases illustrate that what took place
between Mr. Trujillo and Officer Beesley was an impermissible stop
and detention, not a citizen-police encounter.

In State v.

Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), an officer approached
defendants in an all-night laundromat at 1:00 a.m.

The officer

asked the individuals for identification and what they were doing
there.

This Court held that "there was no improper seizure or

detention in the questioning."

Id. at 105 (emphasis added).

There

was "no improper seizure" because the officer articulated
reasonable, objective facts upon which he based the stop.
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), an officer
stopped two men walking near the scene of a burglary.
told the men to stop and asked for identification.

The officer

A back up

officer arrived and the officers phoned in a warrants check.

This

court considered this a "seizure" and held that the officers did not
have a reasonable suspicion based on objective facts to justify the
stop.

Thus, in both Swanigan and Whittenback, this Court considered

the stop a seizure requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion.
The actual stop in this case is similar to those in
Swanigan and Whittenback.

As in Swanigan, the officer ordered the

defendant and his companion to stop.

Unlike the situation in

Christensen where the defendant approached the officers, in this
case, Officer Beesley approached Mr. Trujillo and told him not to go
anywhere.

In Swanigan and Whittenback, the officers first asked for
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identification.

In the present case, Officer Beesley proceeded

directly into an investigation by asking the individuals to justify
their presence.

Thereafter, he asked for identification and a

backup officer arrived.

Since the stop in this case is

indistinguishable from those in Swanigan and Whittenback and Section
77-7-15 requires a reasonable suspicion to justify any stop, the
actions of Officer Beesley constituted a seizure.
II.

THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION
NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE SEIZURE OF APPELLANT.

As outlined in Appellant's Brief, a police officer must
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts in
order to detain an individual.

(Appellant's Brief 4-15).

As set

forth in Appellant's Brief, no such reasonable suspicion existed in
this case.
In support of the officer's actions the State contends that
"[t]he appearance of these three men at 3:30 a.m. in a high crime
area gave the officer not only the right but the duty to question
them."l

Brief of Respondent at 7.

In discussing this question of

1

The State relies on State v.Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash. App.
1984), for this proposition. However, the court in Belanger
admitted that the officer there "did not have a well-founded
suspicion of criminal activity based on articulable objective facts
or circumstances which would have justified him in stopping and
detaining the defendant in the first instance." Id. at 783
(emphasis in original). The Belanger court then stated that the
officer had "the limited right and duty to approach and inquire
about what appeared to be suspicious circumstances." Id. (emphasis
added). The facts in Belanger are very distinct from the case at
bar. In Belanger the officer had the "limited" right and duty to
approach and inquire because upon stopping his car he spotted "a
rifle barrel protruding from defendant's duffle bag and pointed in
his direction." Id. at 782. That fact in conjunction with others
gave the officer the "limited" duty; nothing as acute occurred in
the case at bar.
-7 -

duty, often referred to by the State as justification for intruding
into the rights of otherwise law abiding citizens, a commentator has
reasoned:
When writing opinions I have often been tempted
to state the test of the reasonableness of police
officer's conduct in terms of what the reaction
would be if he had not done what he is charged
with having done wrongfully. If you would fire
the officer for not doing what he did, then what
he did was reasonable. . . . I agree that it
isn't a very stylish way of expressing the
concept of reasonableness, and that somewhat
circular reasoning is involved. But to me there
is value in restating the question so that the
whole problem may be seen.
W. Schaefer, The Suspect and Society 41-42 (1967) (quoted in LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 9.3 n.60 (1987)).
Despite the officer's reference to downtown Salt Lake City
as a high crime area, a stroll along State Street in the early
morning hours glancing into store windows is not per se criminal
behavior.

The State's position would seem to suggest that police

officers have a duty to stop all early hour walkers.

Such a

requirement is not only contrary to basic constitutional rights and
guarantees, but it is impractical as well.

Had the officer left the

appellant and his companions alone, he would not have come under
fire for his behavior.

He also had the option of merely observing

them until something more justified action on his part.
The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47 (1979), stated that location alone was insufficient to justify a
Terry stop.

Id. at 52. The Court also added that "[i]n the absence

of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance
between the public interest and the appellant's right to personal
security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police
intervention."

Id.

That a police officer has a duty to investigate
-8 -

citizens walking in the early morning hours is a stretch of the role
police play in our society.

Such a duty should only attach when a

reasonable basis exists for the officer "in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner [to] approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior . . . "
Terry supra at 22. 2
A final admonition comes from the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Trullo, 809 F. 2d 108 (1st Cir. 1987).
In upholding the investigation of police officers in a high crime
area known as the "Combat Zone" of Boston and in conjunction with
other prior observations, the Trullo court stated:
[W]e believe it is appropriate to state that the
facts presented by this case, in our view,
represent the outermost reaches of a permissible
Terry stop; and it should be borne in mind that
" . . . in law as in life, today's satisfactory
explanation may very well be tomorrow's lame
excuse."
Id. at 111 (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1280
(2d Cir. 1979)).

In the present case, where Officer Beesley could

not articulate specific, objective facts upon which he based the
stop of Mr. Trujillo, the initial stop was improper and any evidence
flowing from that stop must be suppressed.

* For cases where an officer would have been derelict in his duty
see Commonwealth v. Wascom, 344 A.2d 630 (1975) (officer observes
two men walking in business section at 12:30 a.m. each carrying
armload of unwrapped commercial merchandise); Brooks v. United
States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. App. 1960) (two men recognized as having
prior larceny convictions carrying a new console record player with
the store tags still attached); State v. Bailey, 410 So.2d 1123 (La.
1982) (two men rolling a commercial battery charger down the street
during the early morning hours); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 335 A.2d 512
(1975)(carrying a check-writing machine down the street in a high
crime area at 2 a.m.); and People v. Montgomery, 368 N.E.2d 752
(1977)(individual running in a high crime area with a tape player).
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POINT III.

THE OFFICER WAS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION TO
CONDUCT A FRISK OF THE APPELLANT.

The State supports the frisk of the Appellant by referring
to eight independent factors in the possession of the officer at the
time of the frisk.

See Brief of Respondent at 5-7.

These factors

are scrutinized and successfully negated as grounds for a frisk of
Mr. Trujillo in the Brief of Appellant at 6-21.

However, in short,

a frisk of the person is justifiable only when an officer can
articulate a reasonable belief that the person to be frisked is
armed and dangerous.

In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the

United States Supreme Court stated:
The police officer is not entitled to seize and
search every person whom he sees on the street or
of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a
hand on the person of a citizen in search of
anything, he must have constitutionally adequate,
reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of
the self-protective search for weapons, he must
be able to point to particular facts from which
he reasonably inferred that the individual was
armed and dangerous.
Id. 64.

In the case at bar, the officer stated that he was

concerned for his safety "because of the nervous nature of the
individuals" (T. 12). He later testified that in the past he had
seen the same type of nervous conduct lead to the retrieving of
weapons from the person when frisked (T. 30). The officer
categorized his experience or feeling that the person may have a
weapon as "intuition" (T. 30).
An officer's intuition or hunch, however, cannot operate to
give the officer the reasonable basis for a frisk.

The United

States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, supra, announced that "[d]ue
-10-

weight must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch1, but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience."

Id. at 31. An officer, therefore, must

be able to articulate a reasonable belief that his safety is in
jeopardy before conducting a frisk.

Officer Beesley failed to

articulate such a basis for the search.
The State attempts to support the search of appellant's
person with the testimony of the second officer stating that the
appellant attempted to avoid the pat-down by pulling his hands away
(T. 87). This testimony is insignificant.

Not only does Officer

Beesley directly contradict this statement when he testifies that
Mr. Trujillo was very cooperative during the frisk (T. 12-13), but
the statement is irrelevant—even assuming it to be factual—as the
event occurred after the frisk had begun and therefore cannot be
used as justification for the frisk.
Most of the facts relied on by the State in claiming
justification for the pat-down search appeared prior to the stop.
If the officer was so fearful for his safety from those factors, the
question must be asked as to why the officer did not immediately
conduct a pat-down for safety or, in the alternative, await the
arrival of his backup before even approaching the young men.

The

obvious inference is, of course, that the officer felt no fear from
those factors.
Additionally, the factors which allegedly appear only after
the questioning are similarly unable to substantiate a rational
concern for safety.

The officer testified that the young men
-11-

answered his questions evasively (T. 24). However, a review of the
record shows that they directly answered his questions (T. 25-27).
Even if the young men were evasive in responding to the officer's
question, such behavior is non-threatening and cannot be used to
justify a frisk as case law clearly instruct that a person
approached by an officer need not respond at all but may even walk
away.

See Royer, at 497-98 (refusal to listen or answer does not,

without more, furnish grounds for detention).

Neither does the lack

of identification create an indicia of concern for safety.

See

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (the United States Supreme
Court declares unconstitutional a state statute requiring citizens
to produce identification).
The State also claims that as the officer exited his patrol
car, he observed Mr. Trujillo walk away from the group and place the
knapsack near a garbage can and then return to the group.
Respondent at 6, factor 4.
of Mr. Trujillo.

Brief of

This action does not justify the frisk

Officer Beesley had testified that he feared he

might be shot if he turned his back on the group; he alleged that
fear was produced by the nervous nature of the young men (T. 12).
The knapsack is irrelevant.

It was away from the group and was also

absent from Officer Beesley's articulations of concern for safety.
Accordingly, the knapsack could not justify the frisk of Mr.
Trujillo at all.
As to the alleged nervousness, the Brief of Appellant (at
13-15) negates any utility such a claim might have.

In short,

"nervousness" is a wholly subjective characterization subject to
manipulation and artifice and should be devalued accordingly.
-12-

Such

a claim requires more articulation than simply "nervous nature"; a
specific movement or action must be required as mere suspicions and
hunches alone are unable to support a frisk.

See Terry v. Ohio,

supra, at 31.
Individually and together, the factors urged by the State
to justify the actions of the officer must fail.

They are

subjective rather than objective articulations and they give no
reasonable articulable justification for the search of Mr. Trujillo.
Inasmuch as no articulable reasonable basis justified the
frisk, the fruits thereof must be suppressed in accordance with the
law outlined in Terry and as required by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Joseph
Trujillo, asks this court to reverse his conviction and remand his
case to the trial court for either dismissal of the charges or a new
trial.
Respecfully submitted this

^

? day of ^fri^L, 1987.

KENtf&kL PETER^KDN
Attorney for Appellant
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